How top brass blew £3.5billion on a dud that is a menace to troops

How top brass blew £3.5billion on a dud that is a menace to troops
How top brass blew £3.5billion on a dud that is a menace to troops

Some of them reported back spasms and joint pain or swollen ankles. Others a constant tingling in their hands and feet. Still more emerged reeling from acute hearing loss and nausea.

The noise and vibrations that members of the British Army trials team endured while trying out the latest high-tech vehicle were insufferable. Had the test-drives not been stopped, the damage they suffered could have become permanent.

There were concerns about Vibration White Finger syndrome, an injury suffered by industrial workers handling vibrating heavy machinery, where fingers and toes suffer blood circulation loss and can go white and numb. As it was, more than 30 of the men required medical treatment, with two dozen given steroid injections.

This is the story of the Ajax light tank that makes its drivers sick. One that cannot fire on the move as vibrations affect the gun stabilisation system, and which, due to this issue should not be driven faster than 20 mph — comparable vehicles reach 45 mph.

An armoured vehicle so unwieldy it can’t fit into transport aircraft. A light tank that has cost billions yet could be scrapped before it enters service — and is set to become the most expensive procurement failure in Army history.

The MoD and General Dynamics (UK), the makers of Ajax, seem on course for a legal battle over the eye-watering sums involved

The MoD and General Dynamics (UK), the makers of Ajax, seem on course for a legal battle over the eye-watering sums involved

As Conservative MP and Defence Select Committee member Mark Francois says: ‘It is heavier than a Sherman tank and as stealthy as a Ford Transit full of spanners. And, if you are giving people steroid injections after having been in the vehicle, that tells you everything.’

The scandal of the armoured vehicle’s glaring problems raises concerns about the government’s procurement process and why ministers were not alerted to the difficulties, but instead continued to write huge cheques.

Above all, it poses the fundamental question: How on earth is it possible for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to spend billions on a light tank that does not work?

It is a question to which MPs have demanded urgent answers as they urged the government to seek ‘liquidated damages’ and salvage whatever it possibly can from the billions of pounds of public money already banked by the arms manufacturer behind the vehicle.

Whatever happens, the MoD and General Dynamics (UK), the makers of Ajax, seem on course for a legal battle over the eye-watering sums involved.

Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace, who inherited the Ajax debacle, pulled no punches when he said: ‘We paid for a piece of equipment, we expect it to be delivered, and like any consumer we have rights. If it’s not up to scratch, we’ll take action.’

If only things were so simple. General Dynamics (UK) has received in excess of £3 billion for design and manufacturing work already completed, and these payments were made after the MoD agreed the company had met its production targets. The money will never be seen by the taxpayer again.

So where does responsibility lie?

The answer is complicated but involves an extraordinary ‘revolving door’ process whereby senior Army staff have ended up working for the firm that makes Ajax, General Dynamics (UK).

How on earth is it possible for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to spend billions on a light tank that does not work?

How on earth is it possible for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to spend billions on a light tank that does not work?

It includes decisions to reject a cheaper alternative made by British Aerospace (BAe), and then to change the vehicle’s design half-way through the process.

On top of this, there is the hubris of decision makers in the Army with their insistence that only the very best machine, with the latest technology, would do.

To understand where things went wrong, we must examine these issues, starting with the ‘revolving door’ between the MoD and General Dynamics (UK).

Certainly, for a clique of former British Army generals, the company has proved highly lucrative.

After overseeing procurement projects at the MoD, for which they were handsomely rewarded and given gold-plated pensions, they cashed in by joining the arms manufacturer.

General Dynamics (UK) hires these senior officers and defence officials not only because of their knowledge of securing contracts, but also because of their relationships with their successors at the MoD — the people responsible for deciding what equipment the UK’s armed forces should purchase.

The most senior soldier to spin through this revolving door is the former head of the Army, General Sir Peter Wall.

Sir Peter completed his term as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in January 2015. Around the same time he approached the government’s Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA) to say he had been offered a non-executive directorship by General Dynamics — a position which came with a substantial salary.

Given Sir Peter’s knowledge of army procurement contracts, ACOBA advised his appointment should be subject to strict conditions. These included a waiting period of 18 months from the day he left the Army, stipulations he ‘should not draw on information available to him from his time in Government’ and that he ‘should not be involved with matters relating to’ the Ajax contract.

Sir Peter accepted these terms in September 2015 and took up his role with General Dynamics in August 2016. There is no suggestion he breached the ACOBA requirements by getting involved in the Ajax project. Nevertheless, as a board member of the manufacturer’s U.S. parent company he is paid more than $300,000, according to U.S. public sources.

Sir Peter was a Royal Engineer. Two years later he was joined at his new firm by another ex ‘Sapper’ — slang for Royal Engineers — Major General Carew Wilks.

Wilks commanded RE units while in uniform before branching into procurement, eventually becoming ‘Director Land Equipment’ in September 2011 — the year the Army chose General Dynamics (UK) to design and build its new armoured reconnaissance vehicle.

General Dynamics (UK) hires these senior officers and defence officials not only because of their knowledge of securing contracts, but also because of their relationships with their successors at the MoD — the people responsible for deciding what equipment the UK’s armed forces should purchase. The most senior soldier to spin through this revolving door is the former head of the Army, General Sir Peter Wall. He is pictured above with Prince Charles

General Dynamics (UK) hires these senior officers and defence officials not only because of their knowledge of securing contracts, but also because of their relationships with their successors at the MoD — the people responsible for deciding what equipment the UK’s armed forces should purchase. The most senior soldier to spin through this revolving door is the former head of the Army, General Sir Peter Wall. He is pictured above with Prince Charles

According to Maj Gen Wilks’s LinkedIn profile, he was ‘responsible for the

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